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Labour market dualism and immigration policy preferences 
 
 
ABSTRACT: What are the effects of labour market deregulation and increased immigration 
inflows on public attitudes towards immigration? Despite increased levels of dualism and 
free movement of labour in European countries over the last two decades, the effects of these 
policy developments are still unclear in the literature. This study argues that high 
concentrations of migrant workers in non-standard forms of employment decrease economic 
redistribution towards, and labour competition with, immigrants. Consequently, the 
politicisation of immigrant-native conflicts is paradoxically lower when immigration and 
labour market dualism cluster together at the occupational level. These claims are validated 
cross-nationally, and in a difference-in-differences setting analysing the impact of the 2005 
German Immigration Act. 
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The progressive deregulation of labour markets and the increasing mobility of foreign labour 
have been two defining features of European public policy over the last two decades 
(Häusermann and Schwander 2012; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016)1. The specific impact 
of these processes on the politicisation of anti-immigrant and anti-globalisation attitudes, 
however, is unclear. On the basis of classical theories of labour market competition, 
decreased employment protection and increased foreign supply should theoretically increase 
anti-immigrant sentiment. Despite the enormous intuitive appeal of this theory, the existing 
scholarly evidence that supply-side shocks of immigrant competition are responsible for anti-
immigrant backlash is dubious, at best (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Malhotra et al. 2013; 
Dancygier and Donnelly 2013). Moreover, the few countries were the success of radical right 
                                                          




parties has been either prevented or most delayed (Ireland and Southern Europe being 
paradigmatic examples) are precisely those more hit by the Great Recession, dualism, and 
immigration inflows. In an era of unprecedented fragmentation of established European party 
systems, understanding the puzzling relationship between labour market policies, 
immigration inflows, and anti-immigrant sentiment seems more important than ever. 
 
This paper argues that high concentrations of migrant workers in non-standard forms of 
employment (typical of de-regulated and dual labour markets) decrease immigrant-native 
competition and anti-immigrant sentiment. This means that the effects of country-level 
dualism and immigration will depend on the distribution of migrant workers in more or less 
precarious occupations. In a dual system, the labour market is sharply split between jobs with 
high levels of social and legal protection (i.e. insiders), and a significant share of 
unemployment or workers in temporary or non-standard forms of employment (i.e. outsiders) 
(Rueda 2005, 2006, 2007). In highly dual and deregulated systems, economic redistribution 
towards individuals in precarious occupations is very low (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 
2016). Therefore, when immigrants are highly clustered in non-protected occupations, the 
costs of redistribution towards immigrants are also very low, both for native insiders (who do 
not pay the bill for migrants) and outsiders (who get practically nothing in terms of social 
protection anyway). Apart from the lower costs of inter-ethnic redistribution, competition for 
jobs is also paradoxically low in systems where migrants are highly concentrated in 
unprotected occupations. 
 
This paper makes two central contributions. First, it provides a novel occupational-based 
mechanism for the puzzling resilience to anti-immigrant politics by countries with high levels 
of immigration and precarious labour markets like Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and, to some 
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extent, Greece. It also sheds light on the political consequences that certain combinations of 
labour market deregulation and immigration stocks can have. Inter-ethnic competition 
decreases in dual labour markets where immigrants disproportionally cluster in precarious 
forms of employment. This confirms the importance of occupational-level factors beyond 
canonical rich vs. poor divides measured at the individual or country levels. This also 
suggests that prospective economic risk (i.e. how much one can lose) is much more 
consequential than current economic conditions when understanding anti-immigrant backlash 
(Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). 
 
Secondly, this paper aims at a strong balance between external and internal validity by 
combining two empirical strategies. First, the theoretical expectations are validated using 
hierarchical linear models, the cumulative file of the European Social Survey (covering up to 
28 countries over a decade), and OECD data. The results confirm that the presence of migrant 
workers in a given occupation is linked to anti-immigrant sentiment and restrictive 
immigration policy preferences only when levels of dualism are high. 
 
The second empirical strategy deals with potential unobserved variable biases and the 
potential self-selection of specific types of migrants and natives into low-threat occupations. I 
use the German Socio-Economic Panel (1999-2014) and analyse longitudinally the effects of 
the German immigration law that took effect on the 1st of January 2005. After a progressive 
deregulation through the so-called Hartz reforms in the early 2000s, the German labour 
market became significantly more permissive only for highly qualified migrants in 2005. In a 
difference-in-differences setting, I show that highly-skilled German workers (treated group) 
exposed to foreign competition showed more anti-immigrant backlash only when working in 






Migrant distribution and labour market characteristics 
The main expectation is that a high concentration of immigration in occupations with high 
levels of dualism should be associated with low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe. 
This particular distribution of immigration stocks across the occupational structure leads to: 
1- low levels of inter-ethnic economic redistribution, and 2- low competition for jobs with 
migrants. The remainder of this section elaborates on the welfare redistribution and job 
competition aspects of the theory. 
 
Low inter-ethnic welfare redistribution 
 
A dual labour market is one with a sharp distinction between insiders and outsiders. Insiders 
are individuals working in occupations with high levels of legal and social protection. This 
means that insiders have permanent job contracts, and are costly to fire by employers. 
Outsiders, by contrast, work with temporary contracts and sometimes even without contract. 
Non-standard forms of employment are typically more precarious and less protected in terms 
of regulations and social compensation. In practice, a highly dual system has a large 
proportion of outsiders, and high levels of protection only for insiders (Rueda 2005; King and 
Rueda 2008). Labour market deregulations across Europe have increased differences between 
insiders and outsiders, lowered overall levels of employment protection, increased flexibility, 




The consequences of labour market dualism on individual social policy preferences and 
voting behaviour have been widely studied in the comparative political economy literature 
(Häusermann and Schwander 2012; Emmenger et al. 2012). Because of their different 
exposure to short and long-term risk, insiders tend to articulate different preferences over 
taxes and welfare than insiders. Among other things, dualism generates a sharp divide within 
working class constituencies traditionally voting for social-democratic parties (Rueda 2007). 
While most of the literature on social policy preferences has been very income-focused 
(Meltzer and Richard 1981; Alesina and Giuliano 2011), the study of dualism fits into a 
tradition of research more interested in risk and prospective economic shocks as determinants 
of preferences for economic redistribution and the welfare state (Iversen and Soskice 2001; 
Cusack et al. 2006; Rehm 2009; Alt and Iversen 2017). 
 
As convincingly argued by Fernández-Albertos and Manzano (2016), dual labour markets are 
not particularly generous in terms of welfare redistribution, and strongly moderate 
preferences of outsiders. Even if low-income respondents are typically expected to be the 
primary beneficiaries of redistribution and to support generous welfare systems, this is 
significantly less so in highly dual systems. Assuming a contributory logic quite extended in 
European social security systems, welfare benefits tend to be a function of past contributions. 
In a highly dual system, workers contributing to and benefit from the system are mostly 
insiders. The consequence is that outsiders, with generally low levels of income and 
education, are paradoxically less interested in maintaining or expanding redistributive 
systems for which they are not eligible (Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2016). 
 
The expectation that average preferences for redistribution drop in segmented (or dual) 
markets is consistent with Alt and Iversen’s (2017) work. When conceptualising the effects of 
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dualism from a perspective of insurance against economic shocks, labour market 
segmentation generates a more uneven distribution of unemployment risk that lowers 
aggregate levels of redistribution preferences (Rehm 2009). What this logic does not 
necessarily contemplate, however, is that workers in precarious situations will not 
systematically prefer redistribution in highly dual systems either, and that the marginal 
welfare cost of immigration pressure can be negligible in those situations. 
 
Immigration has also proved to be a strong determinant of redistribution preferences (Alesina 
and Glaeser 2004). More specifically, high levels of ethnic diversity in specific contexts have 
been shown to correlate with decreased provision of public goods and preferences for 
redistribution (Dahlberg et al. 2012). While the theoretical mechanisms behind this 
generalised finding are not always clear, the anti-solidarity effect of (perceptions of) 
immigration is widely documented (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Eger 2010; Finseraas 2012; 
Muñoz and Pardos-Prado 2019). Decreased levels of trust, competition for scarce material 
resources, and cultural distaste are some of the most likely mechanisms behind the anti-
solidarity effect of immigration. 
 
When putting the consequences of dualism and immigration together, one would expect a 
stronger anti-immigrant and anti-solidarity effect in those contexts where immigrants benefit 
more from economic redistribution. Consequently, a high concentration of immigrants in 
highly dual occupations should reduce anti-immigrant backlash, since immigrants do not 
benefit from or are not even eligible to welfare benefits. This reduced ethnic penalty should 
affect preferences of both insiders and outsiders. On the one hand, native insiders do not 
expect to pay for inter-ethnic redistribution, given that benefits are based on labour market 
contributions, and that migrants are not clustered in occupations benefitting from welfare. On 
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the other hand, native outsiders do not have reasons either to fear an ethnic penalty to welfare 
benefits. This is because they are not contributing much to the system due to their 
employment status (i.e. the cost does not increase), and do not compete for welfare resources 
that are not receiving anyway (i.e. the benefit does not decrease). This argument can be 
summarised in the following hypothesis: 
 
• H1: a high concentration of immigrant workers in an occupational group is 
associated with lower (higher) anti-immigrant policy preferences when the levels of 
occupational dualism are high (low). 
 
 
Low prospective job competition 
 
Labour market features can also have consequences for the fear of losing one’s job in a 
context with immigration, or for potential income losses when one can plausibly be 
substituted by a migrant. While individual and country-level analyses may be too coarse to 
grasp nuanced patterns of inter-ethnic competition, recent research has shown that zooming 
in on specific occupations and industries is a valuable strategy to unpack effects that could 
otherwise remain overlooked (Ortega and Polavieja 2012; Malhotra et al. 2013; Dancygier 
and Donnelly 2013; Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016; Polavieja 2016). 
 
Influential research convincingly shows that inflows of migrants increasing the supply of 
labour have null effects on natives’ attitudes towards immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 
2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). This contradicts a long-standing intuition in the social 
sciences based on the factor-proportions model, expecting natives to dislike foreign workers 




Regardless of the level of immigration, however, new research shows that professions in low 
demand, with few exit options, and with low skill transferability are more sensitive to 
potential competition with migrants (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). This could seem 
paradoxical, since other dimensions of skill specificity (the opposite of skill transferability) 
also increase workers’ feelings of insulation against migrant competition and substitutability 
(Ortega and Polavieja 2012; Polavieja 2016). However, prospective economic shocks in 
professions with low chances of relocation and requiring high investments in human capital 
are likely drivers of job market anxiety and anti-immigrant sentiment. The labour economics 
and political economy literatures have shown that high levels of skill specificity correlate 
indeed with higher income losses in case of unemployment or job mobility (Shaw 1987; 
Zengelidis 2008; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009), and with higher levels of support for 
social protection (Iversen and Soskice 2001).  
 
Building upon the logic of prospective economic risk, workers have more to lose when facing 
competition in highly protected occupations. However, this risk should be conditional on how 
easy it is to find a similar level of protection and job status in case of need. When exposed to 
migrant competition, native workers should feel more threatened when they have more to 
lose: in contexts with high levels of protection (or low levels of dualism) and when their 
options to find a similar job or to transfer their skills in case of need are low. This leads to the 
second hypothesis: 
 
• H2: a high concentration of immigrant workers in an occupational group is 
associated with anti-immigrant policy preferences when the levels of occupational 





The intuition behind H2 can be illustrated with examples. A machine operator in the chemical 
or automobile industries in Germany should feel higher levels of threat than a waiter working 
in restaurant services in Spain. From a classical labour market competition perspective, this 
wouldn’t make any sense: a German machine operator has a vocational training degree, high 
levels of skill specificity, and relatively good levels of employment protection. However, 
when exposed to perceived sources of threat like immigrant competition, workers in German 
factories can fear higher marginal income losses and prospective shocks than in Spanish 
restaurants. Even if the level of precariousness of a Spanish waiter in a temporary and low-
payed contract is higher, the added economic cost of being exposed to immigration is low. 
Spanish restaurant services may have low levels of protection, but it is easier to transfer 






Data and method 
The empirical analyses below rely on the cumulative file of the European Social Survey 
(ESS)2, and include native-born individuals from up to 28 countries (when data for all 
countries are available) and six rounds (between 2002 and 2012). ESS data are ubiquitously 
used in comparative research on public opinion, and on attitudes towards immigration in 
particular. The high levels of validity, reliability, and comparability of survey items across 
countries and over time make the ESS an ideal dataset to use. 
 
I use three items tapping into preferences for immigration policy, which is the main 
dependent variable. These questions ask whether the country of residence should admit 
immigrants 1) of the same race/ethnic group as the majority, 2) of different race/ethnic group 
from the majority, and 3) from poorer countries outside Europe. The four response categories 
have been recoded from positive to negative: ‘allow many’, ‘allow some’, ‘allow a few’, and 
‘allow none’. The three items have high inter-item reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.89) and 
have been added into a single scale measuring restrictive preferences for immigration policy. 
Table A1 in the Appendix replicate the main findings using attitudes towards immigration as 
the main dependent variable3. 
 
As regards the independent variables, I strictly follow Fernández-Albertos and Manzano’s 
way to operationalise labour market dualism (2016). First, I measure the share of outsiders 
                                                          
2 https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ (01/10/18) 
3 Those items are 0-10 scales measuring attitudes on whether (1) immigration is bad or good for the country's 
economy, (2) the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, and (3) immigrants make the 
country a worse or better place to live. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.85 for the three items above indicates high 





(i.e. unemployed or working without a permanent contract) per country. Second, I use the 
employment protection of labour index (EPL) compiled by the OECD4. More specifically, 
this index measures the strictness of employment protection concerning individual and 
collective dismissals (regular contracts). Third, I simply multiply the share of outsiders by the 
strictness of employment protection. In the analyses below, I compute this index per country-
occupation (on the basis of ISCO 4 digits international classification). Higher values in these 
indexes correspond to more dual labour markets, with a higher share of workers in non-
standard forms of employment and higher levels of employment protection5. 
 
When averaging out all the ESS waves included here at the country level in Figure 16, France 
stands out as the most dual system by far. Despite this extreme value, Greece, Portugal, Italy, 
and Ireland are significantly above average. Slovenia and the Netherlands are also slightly 
above average, but closer to the European mean. In sum, Figure 1 confirms the well-known 
and unusually high level of labour-market dualism in Southern European democracies. 
However, it is important to note that the index is operationalized at the occupational level in 
the statistical models below. The country-level aggregation is just an illustration that could be 




The presence of immigrant workers is measured as the share of migrants (i.e. not being born 
in the country of residence) in each country-occupational group included in the analysis, on 
                                                          
4 https://stats.oecd.org/ (02/10/2018) 
5 Given their skewed distribution, I use the natural logarithm of occupational dualism and occupational presence 
of immigrant workers in the statistical analyses below. 
6 The figures have been produced with the plottig package for Stata designed by Bischoff (2017). 
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the basis of data available in the ESS7. All models also include a number of exogenous 
individual-level controls that have proved relevant in previous research on attitudes towards 
immigration: years of education, religiosity (measured on a 0-10 scale), age, and gender 
(where 1 is male, and 0 female). I also include some country-level controls imported from 
OECD databases, including the share of foreign-born population, GDP (in PPP), the 
unemployment rate, and the share of social expenditure over GDP. 
 
My data structure is nested in a hierarchical way, whereby individuals (level 1) are nested in 
occupations (level 2), countries (level 3), and waves (level 4). Since we have variables 
measured at all levels of analysis, hierarchical linear models are a useful statistical technique 
to take into account the clustered structure of the data and avoid artificially deflated standard 




Table 1 presents a number of fully specified models predicting anti-immigration policy 
preferences. The first model shows the direct effect of occupational dualism and immigration. 
On average, high levels of dualism are significantly associated with anti-immigrant 
preferences, and occupational immigration levels have insignificant effects. The direct test of 
our first hypothesis of interest, however, relies on the interaction between the occupational 
presence of migrant workers and dualism shown in the second model. As expected by H1 
above, the multiplicative term is negative and significant (99% level), indicating that the 
presence of immigrant co-workers is linked to lower anti-immigrant sentiment in occupations 
                                                          
7 Measuring migrant shares from survey data is not perfect, as more settled migrants could be more likely to be 
included in national random probability samples. However, the bivariate correlation between migrant presence 
and dualism at the occupational level is -0.1, suggesting that migrant workers are equally likely to be measured 
at all levels of occupational dualism, and that the results here are not biased in one obvious direction.   
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with high levels of outsiders. Figure 2 depicts the marginal effect of immigrant presence 
across values of occupational dualism, and shows that the presence of immigrants becomes 
less threatening (i.e. its effect on anti-immigrant preferences decreases) as the proportion of 




[FIGURE 2 AND 3] 
 
The third model in Table 1 tests H2 above. The expectation here is that a high concentration 
of immigrant workers is associated with stronger anti-immigrant sentiment when 
occupational dualism and skill transferability are low. In other words, immigrants are 
expected to be more threatening when working in more desirable and protected occupations 
with low job availability in case of need. This is tested with a 3-way interaction between 
occupational dualism, occupational immigration presence, and skill specificity. I measure 
skill specificity following the influential approach by Iversen and Soskice (2001)8. Higher 
values in this measure mean higher levels of specificity, which correspond to major 
occupational groups with a higher level of task compartmentalisation and a relatively low 
share of the workforce able to perform those tasks. As shown in the triple multiplicative term 
of model 3 in Table 1, the interaction between dualism, immigration, and skill specificity is 
significant at the 95% level. 
 
                                                          
8 This measure consists of the share of ISCO-88 unit groups over the total number of unit groups in a major 
occupational cluster, divided by the share of workforce that the major group represents. This measure is then 




Figure 3 summarises the marginal effect of the share of migrants in a given ISCO 
occupational group on anti-immigrant attitudes (Y axis) across values of occupational 
dualism (X axis), for both the highest and the lowest level of skill transferability. 
Interestingly, the only significant effect on anti-immigrant sentiment is observed in jobs with 
low levels of dualism (left-hand side of the graph) and skill transferability. In other words, 
desirable jobs with high levels of protection that are more difficult to find are the ones more 
sensitive to immigrant competition. By contrast, low levels of dualism combined with high 
levels of skill transferability are insignificantly related to anti-immigrant preferences. 
Interestingly, immigrant competition has a completely flat slope when skill transferability is 
high. It is only when skill transferability is low that labour market competition and dualism 
can have significant effects. When there’s not much availability of jobs at similar levels of 
skill, the interaction between dualism and immigration is particularly consequential: native 
workers react more negatively when competing with migrants for highly protected jobs. 
 
The same models reported in Table 1 have been replicated with anti-immigrant attitudes 
(instead of immigration policy preferences) as the dependent variable in Table A1 in the 
Appendix, showing virtually identical results in terms of signs and significance of the key 
coefficients. Table A2 replicates the same models while controlling for the occupational 
average of migrant education and income, to deal with the possibility that migrant selection 
into different types of labour-market and welfare states are driving the results (Polavieja et al. 
2018). Table A3 deals with the possibility of some structural breaks or time dependencies 
(especially after the 2008 financial crisis) driving the results with two alternative model 
specifications: including wave fixed-effects in a cross-classified specification, and controlling 
for a post-2008 dummy. Finally, Table A4 replicates Table 2 controlling for Gini scores of 
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income inequality and the redistributive power of the welfare state (market Gini minus Gini 
after taxes and transfers). 
 
Difference in differences analysis 
 
The 2005 German Migration Act 
 
The previous analyses confirm the intuition summarised in H1: when migrants are highly 
clustered in precarious occupations not benefitting from welfare redistribution, levels of 
ethnic threat among native populations are low. The second hypothesis looked at immigrant-
native conflicts from a labour market competition perspective. When levels of dualism and 
skill transferability are both low, competition with immigrants is more threatening. This 
means that migrants are perceived as more threatening when competing for scarce jobs with 
high and desirable levels of protection. 
 
The analyses above are inevitably vulnerable to unobserved variables simultaneously shaping 
the distribution of migrants, the resulting level of job protection, and native attitudes in 
occupational groups. For instance, immigrants could self-select into less hostile workplaces 
and environments in the first place, which are subsequently deregulated by natives to avoid 
inter-ethnic transfers of different sorts. Similarly, native workers with high abilities could 
self-select into occupations with low ethnic-threat. 
 
This section focuses on the causal impact of immigrant access to certain occupations with 
different levels of protection. More specifically, I look at the German Migration Act, which 
came to force on the 1st of January 2015. This law was considered as a major overhaul of 
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German migration policy, and the official recognition of Germany as an immigration country. 
The law was the result of a debate about the lack of skilled workers in the IT sector in the 
early 2000s. The Independent Commission Migration that resulted from that debate published 
a report in July 2001, confirming the need of highly qualified immigrants to offset labour 
market shortages9. The 2005 German Migration Act streamlined procedures in terms of 
residence requirements, and made citizenship accessible for the first time to children born in 
Germany to a foreign parent who had been legally residing for 8 years. 
 
More importantly for labour market purposes, the law made a clear distinction between low 
and highly qualified migrants10. Migrants with low qualifications from non-EU countries 
were still denied access to simple jobs. Even job-seekers from Eastern European countries 
joining the EU in 2004 were not automatically granted access to the German labour market. 
By contrast, highly qualified migrants got a much better deal, regardless of where they came 
from. The new law allowed computer experts to stay indefinitely, foreign graduates in 
German universities to stay, and self-employed foreigners able to create jobs or make high 
economic investments to remain. The law also significantly streamlined bureaucratic 
procedures to obtain work and residence permits, but only for highly qualified migrants. 
 
In all, the 2005 German Migration Act can be considered as an exogenous shock increasing 
migrant competition only for highly qualified German workers (treated group) and not for 
Germans below university qualifications (control group). If the theoretical expectations 
sketched out above are valid, the law should reduce anti-immigrant concern among the 
treated group, but only in those occupations with high levels of dualism. By contrast, 
allowing more foreign competition should increase anti-immigrant concern among those 
                                                          
9 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/migration-citizenship/germany.php (17/02/2019) 
10 https://www.dw.com/en/first-german-immigration-law-takes-effect/a-1442681 (17/02/2019) 
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affected by the law and working in more protected occupations11. I consider this a difficult 
case study, since highly educated individuals are particularly resilient to anti-immigrant 
attitudes. 
 
The timing of dualism in the labour market is also randomised during the period analysed in 
this case study. The so-called Hartz reforms, officially called “Laws for Reform of the Job 
Market”, were a major redefinition of the German labour market that was progressively 
unfolded in four big legal packages between December 2002 and January 2005 (Gaskarth 
2014). It can thus be argued that there is also a legal intervention progressively increasing 
levels of dualism in some occupations, culminating in 2005, precisely at the same time when 
the Immigration Act comes to force. Previous research confirms that the Hartz reforms 
increased levels of dualism, shortened the typical duration of unemployment, reduced wages, 
and curtailed the generosity of benefits in some occupations (Eichhorts and Marx 2015; 
Bradley and Kügler 2019). 
 
One could argue that native workers with transferable skills selected into occupations with 
higher levels of protection and less dualism in the first half of the 2000, before the 
immigration policy shock. However, for this to be a genuine source of concern for the 
difference in differences estimates on anti-immigrant concern below, one should expect this 
pattern of self-selection to be higher among highly educated individuals, and for these 
individuals to be able to anticipate the specific types of occupations affected by the 2005 
immigration law. Even assuming such a tall order of strategic behaviour and policy 
                                                          
11 The specific model specification reported in this section could be denoted as 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡, 
where Y is the level of anti-immigrant concern of individual i in year t,  b is the difference-in-difference 
estimate, and 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable where 1=individuals with a university degree in 2005, and 0=everyone 
else. Note that, when modeling individual (𝛿𝑖) and survey-year (𝑤𝑡) fixed-effects, the difference-in-difference 
estimate captured by b is mathematically equivalent to modeling the interaction between high levels of 
education and the year 2005. 
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anticipation, one would expect the direction of the bias to be the opposite as the one expected 
here. The theory expects highly educated individuals moving into highly protected 
occupations (i.e. with lower dualism) to be less happy about immigration. It is thus unclear 
why they would rationally self-select into occupations with more inter-ethnic competition. In 
any case, the empirical analyses below will assess the plausibility of the assumption of 
parallel trends between treated and control groups before the policy intervention, which is 




The study of the 2005 German Immigration Act allows for a difference-in-differences set up, 
where one would expect levels of anti-immigrant concern to vary after the policy shock in the 
treated group but not in the control group. More specifically, I use the core module of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), consisting of 16 waves (from 1999 to 2014). The 
dependent variable is based on the question, “How concerned are you about Immigration to 
Germany?” with three categories: Very concerned, Somewhat concerned, Not concerned at 
all. Responses have been recoded to range from not concerned at all to very concerned. The 
treatment is a dummy variable where respondents with university education in 2005 get the 
value 1, and everyone else gets the value 0 (i.e. respondents with qualifications below 
university degree, and individuals with a university degree in any other year). 
 
Table 2 reports a number of longitudinal difference-in-differences models with individual 
fixed-effects, survey-year fixed effects, and clustered standard errors at the level of the 
individual12. The first column includes the whole of the German labour market, and shows an 
                                                          
12 Table A5 in the Appendix replicates the results shown in Table 2 with bootstrapped standard errors. 
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insignificant effect of the treatment variable. The second column replicates the same analysis 
only including occupations above average levels of dualism (0.14). Consistently with our 
theory, the coefficient of the treatment variable is negative and significant (b = -0.08; se = 
0.03; p = 0.02). This indicates that, when exposed to potentially higher levels of foreign 
competition, highly skilled individuals working in dual occupations with little aggregate 
protection became less concerned with immigration. The third model in Table 2 replicates the 
same analysis only including occupations below average levels of dualism. In this case, the 




Even if dualism levels are not randomised as such, the last model in Table 2 models the 
interaction between the treatment variable and occupational dualism. Consistently with my 
expectations, the multiplicative term is negative and highly significant. Figure 4 depicts the 
marginal effect of our treatment variable increasing anti-immigrant concern (high values on 
the Y axis) across levels of occupational dualism (X axis). In striking consistency with the 
cross-national analyses shown above, exposure to increased migrant competition (proxied by 
the liberalisation of immigration law in 2005 affecting only highly skilled Germans) 
increased anti-immigrant concern only at very low levels of dualism, in occupations where 
almost everyone enjoys permanent contracts and high levels of protection. However, even 
keeping high levels of education constant, anti-immigrant concern decreases in occupations 






The validity of the estimates shown in Table 2 naturally depends on the assumption of 
parallel trends across treated and control groups before the treatment. Table A6 in the 
Appendix replicates the second model in Table 2 (the one validating our main expectation) by 
interacting the treated group (highly skilled workers) with each pre-treatment period since 
1999. The results show insignificant differences in anti-immigrant concern between treated 
and control groups up to 2005, and in the first post-treatment period in 2006. This robustness 
check gives some plausibility to the parallel trends assumption, and gives credence to the 
expectation that it was implausible for treated individuals to anticipate the combined effects 
of dualism and immigrant exposure that came about in 2005. 
 
Still in terms of parallel trends, it could be argued that, despite the policy shock showing 
significant results, individuals with higher and non-higher educational levels still managed to 
self-select into different occupational profiles with different levels of economic protection 
and ethnic threat. Table A7 in the Appendix shows the same substantive results as Table 2 
while controlling for unit-specific trends (interacting the group of highly educated individuals 
with a time trend). Those trends come out as insignificant, and the sign and significance of 
the treatment variables remain unchanged. 
 
I also replicate our results using Abadie’s (2005) semiparametric difference-in-differences 
estimator. This technique consists of weighting the trend for the untreated respondents based 
on their propensity to select into the treatment, in order to give more weight to untreated 
respondents who were highly likely to get treated. The weights are calculated on the basis of 
income, social class (Erikson et al 1979), gender, age, having a temporary contract, years of 
education, skill specificity (Iversen and Soskice 2001), and occupational unemployment 
(Rehm 2009). When replicating the second model in Table 2, Abadie’s method confirms the 
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expected negative and highly significant effect of our treatment variable on anti-immigrant 
concern (b = -0.34; se = 0.03; p = 0.000), and gives further reassurance that the assumption of 
parallel trends is not violated in any obvious way. 
 
Finally, Table A8 in the Appendix performs a robustness check with an even higher level of 
homogeneity between treated and control groups. This analysis only includes individuals with 
a university degree throughout the whole time span. In this case, the treated (control) group 
corresponds to highly educated individuals in occupations with above (below) average levels 
of dualism. As expected, the coefficient of the treatment variable is negative and significant 




What are the effects of labour market deregulation and increased immigration inflows on 
immigration attitudes and policy preferences? Despite the prominence of increased labour 
market dualism and free movement of labour in European countries over the last two 
decades, their independent or joint effect on the politicisation of immigration sentiment is 
unclear. In fact, labour market policies and economic threat paradigms have been 
ubiquitously questioned in recent and influential scholarship. 
 
The main argument presented here is that exposure to immigrant competition hardly ever 
increases anti-immigrant sentiment in contexts of deregulation. When zooming into 
occupational levels of analysis within countries, it is possible to observe low levels of native-
immigrant conflict when migrants are clustered in unregulated occupations with high levels 
of dualism. If anything, anti-immigrant sentiment increases in occupational groups with a 
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large proportion of insiders and high average levels of job protection. In that case, levels of 
inter-ethnic redistribution and competition for desirable jobs increases. The interaction 
between immigration and labour market dualism at the occupational level is strong, negative 
and significant when predicting anti-immigrant sentiment and policy preferences using ESS 
and OECD data including close to 30 countries during more than a decade. 
 
The main mechanism suggested to make sense of the findings is the low level of economic 
redistribution towards highly dual occupations, which typically involve low employment 
protection and social benefits (Fernandez-Albertos and Manzano 2016). The interaction 
between immigrant presence and labour market dualism is significant when predicting anti-
immigrant attitudes. The second mechanism involves the joint effect of labour market 
dualism and skill specificity (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). Higher levels of economic threat 
are found in jobs relying on a large proportion of secure contracts with low skill 
transferability and demand. This means that native workers react more negatively to migrant 
competition in occupational groups where finding similarly desirable jobs in case of need is 
very difficult.  
 
The causal effect of immigrant exposure becomes particularly plausible when analysing the 
effect of the 2005 German Immigration Act, which came to force precisely after a 
progressive deregulation of the labour market via the Hartz reforms. The 2005 Immigration 
Act reduced labour market and residence barriers to highly skilled migrants. When assessing 
the policy shock in a difference-in-differences setting, highly educated Germans became less 
concerned with immigration in occupations with high levels of dualism, but more concerned 
with immigration in jobs with more insiders and encompassing levels of protection. This 
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Table 1- Hierarchical Linear Models predicting anti-immigrant attitudes 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Occupational migrant share -0.072 -0.03 -0.057  
 (0.15) (0.02) (0.04)  
Occupational dualism 0.180*** -0.049 -0.316**  
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.13)  
Years of education -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.110*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Religiosity -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Age 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Gender 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.156*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
Country % foreign born 0.004 0.003 0.005  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
Country GDP -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Country unemployment 0.017 0.014 0.014  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
Country social expenditure 0.016 0.018 0.018  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
Migrant share x dualism  -0.089*** -0.173*** 
  (0.03) (0.06)  
Skill specificity   0.242*** 
   (0.08)  
Migrant share x skill specificity   0.008  
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   (0.04)  
Dualism x skill specificity   -0.266**  
   (0.10)  
Migrant share x dualism x skill specificity   -0.088**  
   (0.04)  
Intercept 6.201*** 6.319*** 6.347*** 
 (0.52) (0.52) (0.53)  
Wave intercept variance 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) 
Country intercept variance 0.362 0.362 0.364 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Occupational intercept variance 0.117 0.113 0.103 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Individual intercept variance 4.62 4.62 4.61 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
N 53177 53177 53177.000  
Log Likelihood -116746 -116729 -116652  
BIC 233654.5 233631.7 233521.3  
 
Standard errors between brackets 
* 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 

































Treated -0.004 -0.08** 0.01 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Occupational dualism    0.001 
    (0.01) 
Treated x Occupational Dualism    -0.25*** 
    (0.08) 
Survey-year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Individual fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
N observations 346,674 76,678 269,996 346,674 
N individuals 61,778 38,189 55,946 61,778 
 
Standard errors between brackets 
* 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 






Figure 1- Labour market dualism across countries (average values) 
 
 
Figure 2- Marginal effect of % occupational migration on anti-immigrant policy preferences across 










Figure 3- Marginal effect of % occupational migration on anti-immigrant policy preferences across 




Figure 4- Marginal effect of treated group (i.e. highly skilled individuals exposed to the 2005 German 
Immigration Act) across values of occupational dualism 
 
 
 
 
